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Abstract
In this article we show that the price and the profit of an incumbent
firm may increase after a new firm enters its market. Our analysis
suggests that a well-established firm after competition emerges on its
market might benefit from excluding some consumers from the low-
end segment and concentrate only on its loyal consumers. We also
find that strategic de-marketing can increase social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Picture an industry where a monopolist operates initially and serves con-
sumers who differ in their quality valuation and price elasticity. Will an entry
jeopardize the incumbent’s profit or should the monopolist accommodate the
entry? One of the main propositions of economic theory is that competition
leads to lower prices and profits. In this article we present a simple model
with product differentiation where exactly the opposite happens.
We consider the following set-up: there are two segments of consumers
differing in their valuation of quality and price-elasticity. A single product
firm operates at the market without being able to price discriminate among
segments. Our results show that if a low quality firm enters the market and
captures a part of the price sensitive segment it might lead to price and
profit increase. More specifically, if the difference in quality valuation is high
enough the incumbent is better off after entry. Furthermore, we show that as
the price-sensitive segment decreases the equilibrium prices increase. Hence,
the incumbent may benefit from excluding some of its most price-sensitive
consumers. Our finding suggests that a high-quality firm quits the low-end
market entirely if the quality valuation is high enough and the price-sensitive
segment size is sufficiently low. These results indicate that an entry can be
beneficial for the incumbent firm. In addition, our results suggest that this
leads to an increase in social welfare.
This paper contributes to the literature on price-increasing competition.
The main body of this literature (e.g. Rosenthal (1985), Inderst (2002),
Chen and Riordan (2008)) concentrates mostly on price changes after com-
petition picks up. The literature closest to our article deals with the profit
increasing effect of the competition and the strategies an incumbent can pur-
sue in order to increase competition and its profit. Our first result echoes
Gelman and Salop (1983) findings. In their article they claim that an entrant
can secure entry accommodation by adopting a strategy of judo economics.
This strategy refers to a capacity choice sufficiently limited, which restricts
the entrant’s market share after entry. In this case, the incumbent choosing
a higher price than the entrant still can sell its product and under certain
conditions be better off by accommodating the entry. Their model, however,
applies only if the entrant can make credible capacity limitation commit-
ments. As we show in this article there is no need for capacity limitation to
achieve this result.
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Our paper also relates to the literature of segmentation. Several pa-
pers have appeared recently in this field which studied related questions.
By using a model with a single manufacturer serving a market through a
strategic retailer Kumar and Ruan (2006) show that a manufacturer by
complementing the retail channel with an online channel effectively can in-
duce retailers to enhance their support level for the manufacturer‘s product
which increases demand and consequently its profit. Similar findings were
presented by Ishibashi and Matsushima (2009), who analyzed the compe-
tition between a low-end and a high-end firm. In both quantity and price
competition they show that if the low-end firm can capture the whole elastic
segment of consumers that could lead to higher profits for the incumbent.
In their model the existence of low-end firm functions as a credible threat
which induces high-end firm not to overproduce. In our model we show that
the existence of these kind of threats is not necessary to obtain this result.
Alexandrov (2012) analyzes the question of de-marketing in a segmented
market and arrives to the conclusion that horizontally differentiated firms
can be better off by forbidding a group of consumers from patronizing the
firm and leaving that segment to be served by the other firm or a new entrant.
However, quitting the low-end segment by all the firms does not constitute
an equilibrium. If a firm stops serving the price-sensitive consumer group,
the firm‘s competitor is better off since it benefits from higher margins to-
gether with higher volumes. Thus, firms opt for a unilateral quit by their
competitor and might end up serving all consumer segments which gives rise
to a coordination problem. To solve this issue we introduce asymmetric firms
and analyze the effects of de-marketing in a more general model.
Rodrigues et al. (2014) present a model with vertical and horizontal
differentiation to explain the phenomenon of pseudo-generics in the pharma-
ceutical industry. Our model in some context answers a similar question,
however with a different approach and somewhat contradicting conclusions.1
While the authors focus on the competitive aspect of introducing pseudo-
generics, we show that segmentation might play an even more important
role. Our model thus is able to explain why it might be profitable to in-
troduce pseudo-generics, even if there is no competition. Similarly to their
paper we find that introduction of generics and pseudo-generics lead to price
1A technical question might arise regarding this paper’s assumptions about costs and
locations; linear transportation costs would not be consistent with locations chosen at
endpoints. To avoid this problem, we used quadratic costs.
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increases2, however we show that the repositioning induced by market entry
and exit it could increase social welfare. We aim to contribute to this litera-
ture, believing that studies of the pharmaceutical industry (e.g. Grabowski
and Vernon (1992)) support the emphasis on our focus on the segmentation
of the markets.
2 The Model
Consider a mass of consumers with a high-end (H) and a low-end (L) seg-
ment. Each consumer group is uniformly distributed on the [0, 1] interval.
The mass of high-end market is normalized to 1 and the total number of
consumers in the low-end market is µ. In order to consume, each consumer
has to travel to a manufacturer where the desired product can be purchased,
and we assume that transportation costs are quadratic in distance. The two
groups differ fundamentally in (a) their travel cost and (b) their valuation for
the quality of service they receive while shopping. The high-end segment has
a transportation cost of tH , and the low-end group of tL, and consistent with
the above mentioned tH > tL > 0. That is, the low-end consumer group
is more price sensitive than the high-end group. Furthermore, we assume
that consumers from the high-end group value the service as sH while the
price-sensitive group as sL, where sH > sL ≥ 0. Consumers in H demand
only a product with complementary service, while consumers from the low-
end group are indifferent between a product with or without service. Both
consumer groups have a reservation utility of v for the product and each
consumer demands at most one unit. We assume that v is high enough to
ensure that all consumers buy one product in equilibrium.3 To simplify our
calculation we normalize the value of tH to 1 and set sL to zero. Morover,
we assume that sH − sL > tH − tL, hence consumers are more differentiated
in the way they value the services as they are in travel costs.
We consider the following game. First firm choose their location, then
set a price subject to market regulations, finally the market clears. We solve
the game for its subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction.
2Consistent with the findings of Ward et al. (2002) in the food industries.
3In the subsequent analysis we give the exact lower bound of such a v.
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2.1 Benchmark: the monopoly case
Suppose, there is a single firm located at a ∈ [0, 1] producing a product and
selling it by providing a complementary service to it without being able to
price discriminate between the consumers. In line with the previous literature
we consider fully covered market. I.e. we assume that the monopolist is
obligated to cover the whole market.4 The production marginal cost is c > 0,
while the fixed costs are zero. Pricing is therefore not a decision variable for
the monopolist, since they have to set prices to match the lowest valuation.
On the other hand, the monopolist does have a meaningful choice: that of
location.5
A consumer of group j (j = L,H) located at x obtains a surplus from
buying the manufacturer‘s product as follows
CSj = v + sj − tjx2 − p (1)
Thus, in order to maximize its profit a monopolist chooses its location at the
middle point of the unit line6 and sets a price of
pM = v − tL
4
(2)
while its profit equals to
piM = (1 + µ)
(
v − tL
4
− c
)
(3)
2.2 The duopoly case
Now consider that a low-quality firm, l, with no marginal cost enters to the
market and offers a product without any additional service. In the further
4Universal service obligations or USOs are not uncommon in monopoly regulation.
Their use is especially widespread in the area of postal services, utilities and telecommu-
nications. Even though universal service obligation does not prohibit prices that lead to
foreclosure per se, keeping up the service without customers would not be reasonable, mak-
ing such pricing unfeasible. For a detailed discussion on definitions of universal service,
see Alleman et al. (2010)
5As usual, besides the literal geographical interpretation, the choice of location can also
be understood in terms of product differentiation.
6I.e. the monopolist chooses the product characteristics according to the preferences
of the median customer.
5
analysis we refer to the product without any complementary service as low-
quality product, and to the incumbent‘s product as high-quality product.7
In this duopoly game, the two firms make their decision on both location
and pricing. Tackling the first question, we make use of
Lemma 1 In location games with quadratic transportation costs the equilib-
rium locations are the two extremes.
Proof: See d’Aspremont et al. (1979). 
Without loss of generality we assume that firm l is located at 1, while the
incumbent firm (from now on denoted as firm h) is located at 0. Notice that
unlike in the monopoly case, we see maximum product differentiation here.
Since consumers in H demand only the product with an additional service
they keep purchasing the product from firm h, and the surplus of a consumer
located at x obtained from consumption is
CSH =
{
v + sH − x2 − ph if she buys the product from firm h
0 if she does not buy the product
(4)
where ph is the price of the product with complementary service.
Consumers in L value both products similarly, and for that reason they
are indifferent which product to consume as far as their price is equal. De-
noting the price of the low-quality product by pl, the utility of a consumer
in L at x can be given as
CSL =
{
v − tLx2 − ph if she buys from firm h
v − tL(1− x)2 − pl if she buys from firm l (5)
Consumers purchase the product which yields them to the highest surplus.
Thus, the consumer i from the low-end market located at x buys from firm
h if xi ≤ 12 − ph−pl2tL , otherwise she buys from firm l. Hence, the demand
functions of the firms are as follows
DH(ph, pl) = 1 + µ
(1
2
− ph − pl
2tL
)
(6)
7We do not make here any assumption about market coverage; in practice, oligopolies
do not face as strict regulation as monopolies. However, our result will show that even
absent regulation, firms will provide full market coverage.
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and
DL(ph, pl) = µ
[
1−
(1
2
− ph − pl
2tL
)]
(7)
Using (6) and (7) the profit functions of the firms can be given as
pih =
[
1 + µ
(1
2
− ph − pl
2tL
)]
(ph − c) (8)
pil = µ
(1
2
+
ph − pl
2tL
)
pl (9)
Solving the first-order conditions, leads to
Proposition 1 In equilibrium firms charge
pDh =
1
3
[
3tL + 2c+
4tL
µ
]
and pDl =
1
3
[
3tL + c+
2tL
µ
]
.
These are equilibrium prices only if the market is fully covered. For that
we need the surplus of the consumer from group H located at 1 to be non-
negative with the given prices. By evaluating this we set the lower bound of
v consistent with the model. Thus, we need, that
v + sH − 1− 1
3
[
3tL + 2c+
4tL
µ
]
≥ 0 (10)
Simplifying (10) yields
v ≥ v ≡ 1 + tL + 2
3
c+
4
3
tL
µ
− sH (11)
That is, if (11) is satisfied, the market is fully covered in equilibrium and
prices given by Proposition 1 are indeed the equilibrium prices.
Corollary 1 More differentiation results in higher equilibrium prices.
Proof:
∂pDj
∂tL
> 0 for every j = h, l.

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Corollary 2 If the price sensitive segment is increasing the equilibrium prices
are decreasing.
Proof:
∂pDj
∂µ
< 0 for every j = h, l.

The intuition behind these corollaries is that as the differentiation be-
tween products increases the substitution is becoming more difficult which
softens the competition in the market. This gives the firms the incentives
and the possibilities to increase their prices. However, as the more elastic
group is becoming more dominant relative to the less price sensitive segment
the equilibrium prices drop.
Substituting the equilibrium prices into the profit functions given by (8)
yields to
Proposition 2 In equilibrium firms profits are
piDh =
µ
18tL
(
3tL − c+ 4tL
µ
)2
and piDl =
µ
18tL
(
3tL + s− c+ 2tL
µ
)2
Using the result obtained so far we can evaluate the conditions under
which an incumbent is better off by having a low-quality competitor than
serving the consumers from each segment by itself. For this we need
(1 + µ)
(
v − tL
4
− c
)
<
µ
18tL
(
3tL − c+ 4tL
µ
)2
(12)
that is
v < vD ≡ µ
18tL(1 + µ)
(
3tL − c+ 4tL
µ
)2
+
tL
4
+ c (13)
If v ∈ (v, vD) the incumbent profit increases if a low-quality firm enters
the market. Since vD has to be higher than the lower bound of the reservation
prices (v), hence, we have to check if
1 + tL +
2
3
c+
4
3
tL
µ
− sH < µ
18tL(1 + µ)
(
3tL − c+ 4tL
µ
)2
+
tL
4
+ c (14)
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Rearranging (14), yields to
sH > s
D
H ≡ 1 + tL
(
3
4
+
4
3µ
)
− 1
3
c− µ
18tL(1 + µ)
(
3tL − c+ 4tL
µ
)2
(15)
Proposition 3 If the differentiation in quality valuation is high enough a
high-quality firm is better off if a low-quality firm enters to the market than
covering the market as a monopolist.
This above proposition suggests that a firm can be worse off by being a
monopolist than allowing a low-end firm to enter the market. As the entrant
enters the market and captures the price-sensitive consumers the incumbent
serves mostly its most loyal consumers. Since these consumers have signifi-
cantly higher reservation utility the incumbent can rise its price which offsets
the demand loss. In other words, losing the price-sensitive consumers because
of the competition in the low-end segment gives the incumbent the opportu-
nity to set a higher price for the loyal consumers who exhibit a substantially
higher reservation utility.
To show that equilibrium prices in the duopoly case are higher than the
monopoly price, we need
1
3
(
3tL + 2c+
4tL
µ
)
> v − tL
4
and
1
3
(
3tL + c+
2tL
µ
)
> v − tL
4
. (16)
From the left-hand side inequality in (16) we have that v < tL
(
5
4
+ 4
3µ
)
+ 2
3
c.
This needs to be higher than the lower bound of the reservation utilities, and
lower than vD, that is, v ∈ (v, vD), which holds whenever sH > max{sDH , 1−
tL
4
}. In the same way we can calculate the condition when the equilibrium
price of the low-end firm is higher than the incumbent monopoly price. This
yields that sH > max
{
sDH , 1− tL
(
1
4
− 2
3µ
)
+ 1
3
c
}
. The result is formulated
in the following
Proposition 4 If consumer differentiation in service valuation is signifi-
cant, equilibrium prices charged by a low-end and a high-end firm are higher
than the prices charged by a monopolist who covers the market.
9
3 Strategic de-marketing
In fact, under certain conditions the incumbent firm has the incentive to de-
viate from the equilibrium given in Proposition 1. To illustrate this consider
the following. From Proposition 2 we have
Corollary 3 The high-quality firm benefits from excluding some consumers
of the most price sensitive segment if the size of this segment is less than
moderate.
Proof:
∂piDh
∂µ
=
1
18tL
[
(3tL − c)2 −
(4tL
µ
)2]
This is negative whenever µ < µS ≡ 4tL
3tL−c . 
Corollary 3 suggests that the high-quality producer might be better off
by quitting the more elastic segment. In this case prices and profits can be
easily calculated, since in both segments only a specific firm operates and
therefore it will charge a price which binds consumers reservation utility.
Formally, the firms profits can be given as follows
pih = (ph − c)DH(ph) and pil = plDL(pl) (17)
where DH(ph) and DL(pl) stands for the demands faced by firm h and l,
respectively. Since consumer‘s reservation utilities are high enough to provide
non-negative surplus even for the consumer farthest away from the company
she buys from, in equilibrium firms charge prices that consumers with the
biggest distance from the company can still afford.
Notice that instead of a duopoly, we have in fact two separate monopolies
in two separate markets. The choices of location therefore will reflect that of
the monopoly case, each firm setting product characteristics to cater to the
median customer. Formally, we can state the following
Proposition 5 Suppose firm h quits the low-end segment. In equilibrium
firms will locate at the middle of the unit interval and equilibrium prices and
profits are as follows:
pSh = v + sH −
1
4
pSl = v −
tL
4
10
and
piSh = v + sH −
1
4
− c piSl = µ
(
v − tL
4
)
Comparing the results given in Proposition 2 and 5 we can determine
conditions under which strategic de-marketing is indeed an equilibrium. For
this we need
µ
18tL
(
3tL − c+ 4tL
µ
)2
< v + sH − 1
4
− c (18)
A different way to write this is
sH > s
S
H ≡
µ
18tL
(
3tL − c+ 4tL
µ
)2
− v + 1
4
+ c (19)
Hence, we have the following result
Proposition 6 The high-quality firm stops serving the low-end segment if
the consumers differ fundamentally in their complementary service valuation
and if the more price-sensitive segment size is sufficiently low.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is the following. To serve any of the
consumers from L firm h has to lower its price below the reservation utility
of the least valuable consumer from H. The price decrease is more significant
if the service provided by the firm is more valuable to the consumers. Hence,
there is a significant consumer surplus what the high-end consumers obtain
because of the low prices. By quitting the low-end segment, firm h is not
facing any competition from the low-quality firm and therefore can set its
price higher. However, if the low-segment is remarkable is size quitting the
price-sensitive group can hurt the firm‘s profit, since the price increase cannot
offset the loss caused by the major demand loss. Actually, the same happens
when consumers reservation utility is high enough. Softening the competition
by leaving a segment and operating only on one segment, drives prices higher.
As the demand loss is not significant, the profit rises as well.
Notice that when strategic de-marketing is profitable it always leads to
higher average prices as well. This is because the low-end prices are un-
changed after a low-quality firm enters the market and the high-end con-
sumers pay more for their products.
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4 Conclusion
We summarize our results in the following table.
sH < s
D
H s
D
H < sH < s
S
H s
S
H < sH
µ < µS piM > max{piDh , piSh} piDh > max{piM , piSh} piSh > piDh > piM
µS < µ piM > max{piDh , piSh} piDh > max{piM , piSh} piDh > max{piM , piSh}
As you can see from the table the incumbent monopolist is better off
by accommodating a low-quality entrant, if its quality is valued highly by
a group of consumers. Allowing the low-end firm to capture the low-end
market gives the incumbent the possibility to increase its price aggressively
which offsets the loss from demand decrease. Moreover, if the price sensitive
segment is not significant in size the manufacturer is even better off by quit-
ting the low-end market entirely. To achieve this goal the incumbent could
(1) forbid the price-sensitive consumers to purchase its product, (2) pursue a
negative de-marketing campaign or (3) launch a low quality product by itself
and segment its consumers effectively. Our results suggest that competition
can be beneficial for the incumbents. In other words, established firms should
not necessarily get involved in price competition after a new entrant enters
their market but rather focus on (de-)marketing strategies.
Additionally, choosing de-marketing has essentially different implications
regarding product characteristics. The entry of a low quality provider would
most likely lead to maximum product differentiation. In the case of de-
marketing, however, both firms will cater to the tastes of the median con-
sumers of their respective segments. Notice that due to convex costs, in this
case we end up with lower aggregate transportation costs.
This latter result also has consequences regarding social welfare. In our
model, lower aggregate transportation costs necessarily mean higher aggre-
gate welfare. Hence de-marketing could lead to higher social welfare than just
an entrance of a new competitor. Our findings therefore carry a caveat that
in certain cases de-marketing could be considered desirable by regulators.
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